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I'm a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University. My primary research interests are in ethics and aesthetics. During the 2014-2015 academic year, I'll be a visiting lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at UCLA.
Is being partial to a particular set of artworks—your favorite films, "desert island" discs, or much-loved novels—best conceived of as an expression of your idiosyncratic taste, and something for which no reasons might be given? I answer negatively: On the contrary, there are reasons for being partial to particular works of art, even if one recognizes that there are other artworks equally if not more deserving of one's attention. These reasons are intimately connected with the value of one's historical relationship with those artworks. My dissertation presents a philosophical account of the significance of such relationships with works of art. I argue that valuing such relationships is analogous to valuing one's relationships with one's friends, one's projects, or one's ideals: each is an instance of the more general phenomenon of partiality. After presenting a general account of partiality, I use this analogical approach to demonstrate that one's concern for a work of art often extends beyond its artistic value, impartially construed—a point which, I argue, has been little appreciated in contemporary philosophy of art. I deploy this more nuanced account to challenge the Humean tradition in the philosophy of art; to offer a novel account of the role and function of reasoned evaluation in art criticism; and to give a clearer picture of the moral and aesthetic considerations wrapped up in our relationships to artworks and artists. More details are available here. My dissertation advisors are Alexander Nehamas and Michael Smith. I entered the graduate program at Princeton in the fall of 2008; prior to that I received a B.A. in philosophy from Duke University. |
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